The Prague Uprising errupted spontaneously on May 5th 1945 when anti-Nazi demonstrations turned into military actions against German forces. The newly established Czech National Council proclaimed itself the supreme political body of the uprising, usurping the Nazi administration of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. Thousands of barricades were errected that night and into the morning of May 6th. The uprising was a great obstacle to the German units, who wanted desperately to be captured by the Americans, to avoid being captured by the Soviets. The SS units fought back and began to retaliate and massacre civilians. At this moment, the insurgents were joined by Russian Liberation Army units, 1 who had switched sides, assisting the insurgents with the heavy weaponry they needed to endure the attacks.
The German soldiers, trapped in the space around Prague, knew that the general capitulation was signed in Reims and was going to take effect at 9 pm on the 8th of May, and so they launched a general offensive on Prague that morning. The negotiations between the Czech National Council and the German commanders ended with the signing of a German capitulation in the late afternoon of May 8th. Following this, many German units throughout Prague were released into American captivity, but some did not manage to leave the city in time and had to stay and fight the Red Army units that entered Prague on the morning of May 9th. More than 1,600 insurgents, 300 RLA soldiers, 1,000 German and 692 Soviet soldiers died.
Interview with Czech historian Petr Koura conducted by Jan Adamec
We commemorate the 70th anniversary of the end of the Prague Uprising which marked the end of WW2 in Czechoslovakia. What does it mean for you?
It was the end of a six-year period of the occupation and the Nazi oppression of the Czech nation. Those six years completely transformed Czech society and served as the most important period in 20th century Czech history. The Czech resistance movement prepared for these five days for six years starting in 1939, but eventually it all completely went another way than was planned.
If we compare the Prague Uprising with the Slovak National Uprising in August 1944, the latter one had a clear military plan – to launch an uprising, free the passageways through the Carpathian Mountains and let the Red Army into Slovakia. Although it failed eventually, there was a plan, but the Prague Uprising was different.
The uprising errupted spontaneously. We may forget the enormous frustration that had accumulated during those six years. People wanted to do something, but they were scared. The things that had been planned did not work, so there was a great deal of improvisation. There were plans in place from 1939 stating which military unit should attack the radio building or the head of the Protector’s seat, but those plans didn’t materialize. The military resistance structure was in ruins and their leaders were jailed or executed during the occupation.
The Czech resistance did not have arms. What was their idea of an uprising without arms?
There were some depots, hidden in summer 1939, but they were few. The fact was that the pre-1938 army and its commanders were not prepared for this underground way of fighting the enemy. So when the Munich Agreement was signed in 1938 and the Czechoslovak army was demobilized, the military commanders did not think about the alternatives – destroying the arms so they wouldn’t be handed over to the Germans, or storing them in secret depots in order to prepare for guerilla warfare.
The highest commanders of the pre-Munich Czechoslovak army were accustomed to obeying the orders of the civilians politicians. They then clashed with some lower ranking officers, who then formed the resistance group called Three Kings (Mašín, Balabán, Morávek). 2Colonel Mašín suggested to his commander, General Šára, 3that he blow up the military quarters and depots in Ruzyně on the 14th and the 15th of March 1939, but Šára obeyed the orders of the civilian government and declined to do so.
There is a basic difference between Czech and Polish military resistance during the war. While the Poles were mobilized and then fought a war against the Germans, the Czechoslovak soldiers were demobilized, had to come back to their barracks and return their weapons after Munich. The Poles had their weapons and the individual courage of each soldier depended on this.
In Prague, the lack of weapons in the hidden depots, had the organizers of the uprising urging both London and Moscow, two Czechoslovak exile centers, to drop arms in the capital. The head of the Czechoslovak military mission in Moscow, Heliodor Píka, constantly urged the Soviets to drop the arms, but in vain. When the Britons and Americans were asked, they argued that Prague was in the Soviet operational zone, saying they did not want to interfere with Soviet competencies.
But the Germans were not primarily interested in defending Prague until the final moments as was the case with Wien and Budapest.
The Germans needed Prague primarily for its bridges in order to cross the river and escape to American captivity. There were around one milion German soldiers in Eastern Bohemia; they were desperate, pushed into a corner and under the heavy influence of Nazi propaganda – they did not want be captured by the Soviets.
When the Prague uprising errupted, it had a big implication for them, so they decided to soak the city in blood, and massacre civilians in numerous places around Prague and other parts of Bohemia. It was not uncommon for Czech villagers to open fire at German army units from their windows, but the Germans would then retaliate and go back to the village, killing dozens of other people.
Then there is a heretical question – was the Prague Uprising necessary from the military point of view at all?
It might have been rational to say, “let the Germans go though Prague freely to American captivity.” But I think the uprising was important, because it provided the legitimization for the London and Moscow exiles and their activities. The Poles as well as the Slovaks had their uprisings.
Do you have any explanation as to why the Germans did not expect such a violent reaction in Czech areas?
The Protectorate was considered the rear of the Third Reich. The Nazi propaganda materials were full of stories about the cordial relationship between Germans and the inhabitants of the Protectorate, but when you read the secret police’s internal reports from 1944 or 1945, they observed the resistant stance of the Czechs, who were waiting for an occasion to enter the streets.
In reality, the Nazis never perceived the Protectorate as friendly. When you read the 1940 instructions for the wehrmacht soldiers to vacate Bohemia and Moravia, you not only find recommendations about where to have a beer, but also instructions on avoiding Czech women, because the Czechs were considered enemies. The Protectorate administration feared every year that on the 28th of October, when the First Republic was founded in 1918, that something might happen.
When reading the memories of Germans who survived the deportation from Czechoslovakia in 1945, I sometimes have the impression that they expected everything would go back to the pre-1938 years, like nothing changed during the era of occupation. It is almost as if the Germans had a false sense of security (unless we’re talking about the Germans from the eastern parts of Third Reich who fled even before the Soviets conquered the land), and then were surprised by the violent and aggressive reaction from the Czechs who, when the war was over, wanted to settle the score with them.
Ordinary Germans did not expect it. They may have questioned the possibility that the afterwar retaliation would be so violent because they doubted the Czech’s capabilities. They could have thought that it would go more or less peacefully, but the Germans in Prague had to perceive it – the Gestapo members wasted no time and fled on 5 May 1945.
I do understand that the Nazis from the power apparatus “knew” but what about ordinary Germans.
The possibilities to escape were rather limited. The Third Reich had been destroyed and the Protectorate was considered an oasis of peace at the end of WW2. We must bear in mind that there were between 800,000 to 1,000.000 Germans and German fugitives from the eastern parts of Third Reich, who had already been conquered by the Soviets. Plus the Protectorate had been intentionally populated by ethnic Germans since its March 1939 establishment. The Protectorate’s establishment was considered only a temporary solution before Bohemia and Moravia would be fully incorporated into the Reich, populated only by Germans – the Czechs were to be either assimilated, anihilated or deported.
New era, new people
The paradox of the Prague Uprising is that its leading body, the Czech National Council, was almost immediately stripped of its power, and its representatives criticized and sidelined after the uprising ended.
The uprising began to be misinterpreted and politicised immediately. There was a rivalry between the domestic resistance movement and both of the foreign exile centers in London and Moscow. For example, when the resistance fighters were informed about the establishment of the government in exile and the names of the ministers appointed, they objected and disapproved. But the exiled politicians, including President Edvard Beneš, promised them that it was only temporary and that all powers of the exiled resistance would be transferred into the liberated and restored Czechoslovakia.
And what was the result? Prague’s new government, that was established in Košice in April 1945 with the the exiled polilticians’ consent in both London and Moscow, and nobody talked to the CNR representatives. While the Slovak National Council, founded during the Slovak National Uprising, was transformed into the Slovak government, the CNR handed its powers over to the central government. The Soviets never forgave the CNR´s representatives for enabling the legitimization of the RLA and concluding the German capitulation.
What were the real powers of CNR anyway?
Very limited! When then Prime Minister of the Protectorate government, Richard Bienert, 4arrived to the municipal radio station on May 5th 1945 to declare the end of the Protectorate, he was barred from entry and apprehended. This day was thus the end of the Protectorate from a legal point of view. The powers were then transferred to the CNR, who bore the legitimacy of a de facto Czech government, until the return of the government from Košice on May 15th.
How many soldiers did CNR have at its disposal?
More than 30,000 men. People spontaneously entered the streets and signed up for the military squads and were then mobilized.
The Prague uprising also symbolizes the end of one era and the beginning of another one. The former was represented by the formal leader of the uprising, the Chairman of CNR, and university professor, Albert Pražák. 5
Pražák was weak and unable to orient himself in the situation. He was not active in the resistance and only got involved during the second half of the occupation. He was chosen as a patriot, and did not collaborate with the Protectorate´s government. He was a symbolic figure and was known to the public; so he served as a just a figurehead, addressing the public and backing the uprising.
You have told me a rather bizarre story, illustrating well how the people of the “old world” imagined the uprising.
At the very end of WW2, the Nazi leader of the Protectorate, K.H. Frank, 6attempted to declare a government that included members of the resistance. He even ordered an escort from Theresienstadt for two already apprehended members of the resistance movement, Vladimír Krajina 7and Kamil Krofta, 8and tried to persuade them to form a government declaring Czechia under its jurisdiction to prevent the Americans from occupying it.
The members of the collaborationist Protectorate goverment also sought to open communication with the resistance movement and the CNR. When they realized the Chairman of the CNR was Pražák, they sent their own envoy to him, but he was visited by architect Ladislav Machoň, another member of the CNR at the same time, 9who was ordered to bring Pražák to the center of Prague where he could lead the uprising. So suddenly, the envoy of the collaborationist Protecorate government and the representatives of the uprising where in the same appartement. All greet each other cordially. The envoy wanted to persuade Pražák to enter negotiations with the Protectorate government. Machoň promised that they would, but when the envoy left the appartement, they left for the center.
I find it incredible how two completely different worlds – the resistance and the collaborationist one – met in one appartement. Obviously resistance leaders did not want to align with the collaborators, but they did not tell them openly. It all seems very Schweik-like to me. I can imagine that in Poland these people would shoot at each other or insult themselves, but here it transpired in full decency.
Pražák was the symbol for the public. Who was in charge of the uprising?
Initially, the military leader of the uprising was to be a partisan commander, Captain Veselý-Steiner, but he was not able to get to Prague in time. Therefore Captain Jaromír Nechanský, the Chairman of the Military Commission of the CNR, took charge. By the way, Steiner never came to terms with the fact that Nechanský replaced him as the leader of the uprising.
Captains? No generals – not even colonels?
Nechanský embodied the rise of a new, young, ambitious and ferocious generation. They were not members of the Czechosloval Legion, 10nor generals or colonels like the resistance leaders from the so called Three Kings resistance group were; they are all dead. While the Warsaw Uprising was led by generals, the Prague Uprising was in the hands of the captains.
How was it possible?
The Polish generals were better conspired.
The pre-war generals and the elite were liquidated during the occupation?
Yes. The last general of the military underground group, The Nation’s Defense (Obrana národa), General Slunečko, 11went into hiding and returned to Prague on April 20th. He wanted to take charge but he was totally outmaneuvered. Then there was General Kutlvašr b but Captain Nechanský was his political commander. Nechanský, as a political commander, was more important than Kutlvašr, 12as a soldier. This wouldn´t be possible in Poland.
What did it mean, a political commander?
There was a prevailing opinion that politics should prevail over militaristic points of view during the resistance period. Nechanský was a symbol of this new order of things. He had leftist, pro-Communist viewpoints and he was politically ambitious.
How is Nechanský perceived today?
More negatively. Nechanský was considered a hero for a short period of time after the end of war. But it has been proven that he collaborated with the communists and before and after 1948 worked as an informer for Bedřich Reicin, 13who was in the pocket of the Soviet security.
The communist Josef Smrkovský was also a new person within the CNR, who, under normal conditions, would not have climbed into the higher echelons of politics.
Nechanský and Smrkovský are more or less political twins to me. Smrkovský worked in the underground apparatus of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, whose leadership was compeletely decapitated by the Gestapo during the occupation. The Communist resistance was in ruins by May 1945 because the Gestapo managed to liquidate the Communist leadership in Prague. The so called IV. the temporary Leadership of the Communist Party was a huge improvisation, led by young men – Smrkovský was the oldest of them. 14They were true believers in Communism, but never reached higher positions. Smrkovský was deposed after the end of WW2. His party bosses reproached him for allowing RLA involvement in the uprising, when he should have prevented that.
Had the war lasted for more than a year, woud the Communist resistance have ceased to exist?
Probably not. There were plenty of young, enthusiastic men who could have gotten involved in the Communist resistance, but it was in a much worse state than the non-Communist one. However, the Communists managed to conceal the fact that their resistance was as close to liquidation after 1945.
Did the local Communists get instructions from Moscow during the uprising?
Yes. There were several paratroop squads from Moscow around Prague and their mission was to influence the uprising politically.
What happened with other members of the CNR after 1948?
Some of them went to the exile, and others withdrew from politics completely. But they were not reprimanded because the Communists did not officially ackowledged that the CNR was a disgrace.
Nechanský or Smrkovský represented a new young generation, but back then old-new politicians came from exile in London or Moscow and overruled the young ones.
Politicians like Prokop Drtina, 15Hubert Ripka 16or Jaroslav Stránský 17were the people of President Edvard Beneš. They were closely connected with the First Republic Era (1918 – 1938) but they did not hold any important power positions at that time. Now, they were ministers, but they viewed political parties as a necessary evil to power. It was the same with the military leaders of the Czech resistance who also perceived political parties very critically.
What was their idea of democracy when they considered political parties a necessary evil?
Political parties were considered a culprit in the Munich tragedy of 1938. When we read the political program of the local resistance in 1941, For freedom, we see that former political parties were not meant to be restored after the war.
They critized the prewar political model but with what did they want to replace it?
There were huge debates about that. The representatives of the non-Communist resistance wanted something like a national front, comprised of a few great parties, the socialist and non-socialist ones. They rejected smaller parties, representing particular interests, and thought the number of parties should be limited. This continuity with the legacy of the First Republic´s party system should have been broken.
There is a widespread opinion that the Czechoslovak Communists, backed by Stalin, forced the non-Communist politicians to accept the National front idea. But you say that the non-communists wanted more or less the same…
The resistance to political parties was a whole societal phenomenon in 1938, and again in 1945 as well. That feeling deepened in 1940 when France was defeated by Nazi Germany and the democratic system proved to be non-viable and unable to fend off the totalitarian regime. This was combined with the illusion that the Soviet system would be able to democratize and liberalize itself. Quoting a letter from general Bedřich Homola: 18“It is better to lose all property because of the Moscow Communists than to be under Berlin for good. Moscow will not take our land or language away from us, while Berlin will seize everything. In the 30 to 50 years, there will be no Communism, but the Czech nation will persist. Under German reign, the Czech nation will be destroyed in 20 years.” The society became more and more prone to accept the USSR.
When the negotiations began between the Communists and non-Communists in March 1945, they quickly reached the conclusion that the pre-Munich system was no longer acceptable for them. The non-Communists did not seem to know what they wanted, but they faced the Communist politicians who knew perfectly well what they wanted and moreover, considered their political party as the alfa and omega of their lives.
Yes. The non-Communists did not deny democracy, but they were against political parties.
Weren´t they aware that there were no political parties or political competition in the USSR?
They were aware of it, but they lived in the illusion that the USSR would democratize itself, and this was also complemented by the idea that Czechoslovakia was a bridge between the East and the West, and would bring democracy to the USSR and socialism to the West.
It was interpreted that the parties in exile just wanted to get rid of political competition, like the The Republican Party of Farmers and Peasants 19, one of the pillars of the First Republic. But it seems to have been a much deeper problem – the so called “democrats” did not like party democracy at all. It seems like they were voluntarily consenting rather than a making concessions to the Communists.
Even President Edvard Beneš refrained from expressing positive remarks about political parties. They all sought some features of direct democracy, but their goal was to reach national consensus, by which political party competition would only cause harm. So the freedom to establish an unlimited number of political parties was limited. They did not have a clear idea but they were looking for it.
The cinematographic uprising – from pathos to comedies
One of your fields of research is how WW2 has been reflected in Czechoslovak and Czech feature films. How was it with the Prague Uprising?
The first film was a short feature entitled Mother´s Day, 20shot in the summer of 1945. It tells the story of a young mother who is captured by SS soldiers. She then survives the massacre of civilians in Pankrác, a quarter in Prague, so there is a happy ending. All this happened on Mother´s Day, which is usually celebrated every second Sunday in May.
The first feature-lenght film about the uprising was shot in the Spring of 1945, entitled It Rumbles in the Mountains. 21It is set in the countryside, where people revolted against the occupiers and liberated themselves. The Red Army was not present – only from the distance where its artillery “rumbled in the mountains.” In all subsequent cinematographic interpretations, the Red Army played a much more active role in the liberation.
I assume it must be interconnected with the overall reevaluation of the Prague Uprising.
When the first anniversary of the uprising was commemorated in 1946, it was said that without the Red Army, Prague would end up in ruins as Warsaw did in September 1944, which was not true. The German army signed the capitulation before the Red Army arrived, and the Soviets and the Czechoslovak Communists exiled in Moscow were not willing to forgive the Czech National Council’s conclusion to draft a separate capitulation treaty with German forces.
Then two interesting comedies followed.
The plot of the film Big Case 22is based on mistaken identities, a classical comedic tool –in the film an ordinary Czech citizen is mistaken for an SS officer. The film is shot in the spirit of the then famous French wartime comedies. It also mocks the “changing coats” mentality.
1947’s Nobody Knows Anything 23 is a crazy comedy in the Marx Brothers’ style that makes fun of the uprising. In the film two railway men want to get rid of a SA man, and they get him drunk, but he manages to escape and so they chase him. There is a remarkable scene of a premature uprising. When they beat the SA man, people see them and shout, “finally it is here.” People join the crowd, but when they realize it is only a private matter, they disappointingly conclude, “they are beating him privately,” go home and hide the flags.
Obviously the uprising was not taboo at this early stage.
Even the film reviews were not negative. Some of them admitted that even during the period of occupation, there was a space for humor.
Don´t you think that this type of film, making fun of serious events, may underline the Schweik-like stereotypization of the Czechs waging a war?
But humor generally helped people come to terms with the war and its consequences. It was not specific to the Czech case. As far as I know, a comedy about WW2 was shot in Poland in the afterwar period as well.
Did the cinematographic reflection of the Prague Uprising change after the Communists seized power in 1948?
It was an important turn. In 1949, Otakar Vávra shot The Silent Barricade, 24which is a set of microstories without a central hero that the audience could identify with. The central hero is the working class and “the people,” led by Czechoslovak Communist Party. The non-Communist officers from the era of the First Republic are mocked as “false” leaders of the nation.
Can we state that this film codified the obligatory way the uprising should be depicted until 1989?
I agree. Now, the story is not about how the Czechs liberated themselves, but how they were liberated by the Red army, together with its natural allies – anonymous people and the Czechoslovak Communist Party who incited the uprising and were in charge of it. So the Red Army is depicted as the liberation army.
Is it really so that this narrative remained unchallenged by cinematographers until 1989?
The Stars of May, 25shot jointly by a Czechoslovak and a Soviet director, is more about the euphoria from the liberation and the common soldier’s desire to demobilize and get back to their professional and civic lives. The politics is sidelined.
Then after a long period of time the director, Ivo Novák, in his film Marathon 26revived the comedic genre to depict the Prague Uprising. The film did not finish well after it was screened in the autumn of 1968. Obviously the scenes with the Soviet tanks entering Prague was not something the Czech audience was willing to watch. It is a story of young couple – the young man just been released from Nazi jail wants to participate in the uprising but has no rifle – and both young people die at the end.
That does not sound like a comedy…
The film mixes humor, pathos and tragedy as well.
Then comes the peak of the ideological genre, the trilogy shot by director Otakar Vávra in 1974. There is a clear tendency to refresh and upscale his 1949 codification of the one and only version of the history.
The film primarily attempts to reestablish sympathies towards the USSR, which was shaken by the 1968 Warsaw Pact army invasion. We can see that the intensity of ideological indoctrination growing stronger with every part of the trilogy. The Days of Betrayal, 27depicting the time of the Munich Agreement in 1938, is more or less a historical document, although it is portrayed through a manipulative lens, because not all of what happened is said. The second part, Sokolovo, 28named after the battlefield where the Czechoslovak soldiers fought together with the Soviets againt the Nazi Germans, focuses on the exiled government in London plotting against Moscow‘s Communist exile representatives. The last part, the Liberation of Prague, 29is the most ideological one. In the film the anonymous people, led by the Communist Party, revolt and the Red Army saves Prague in the last minute.
We must also add that the soldiers of the RLA are not even mentioned in any of the above films.
Vlasov´s soldiers disappeared. By the 9th of May 1945 they were already “erased” from the memory of the uprising.
Are there any films about the uprising, shot after 1989?
There are only a few of them. First of all, I would mention the comedy Stop, or I will miss the target! 30made by Jiří Chlumský which was an attempt to resuscitate the wartime comedy genre.
It was an ambitious attempt but I do not think it worked. There was an obvious endeavour, excellent actors, but it lacked ideas… it was not funny, it was silly.
I agree. Then I would mention Jan Hřebejk´s Divided We Fall, 31an attempt to deconstruct the heroic narrative of the uprising. The insurgents need not be positive individuals and can also turn from collaborators to revolutionaries.
- Russian forces under the German command during WW2, led by former Red Army general Andrey Vlasov. ↩
- Three Kings (Tři králové) was a Czech resistance group in between 1939-1942. Josef Mašín was caught in 1941 and executed in 1942, Václav Morávek killed in action in 1942 and Josef Balabán caught and executed in 1941. ↩
- General Václav Šára (1893–1941) was a member of the Czechoslovak Legion and the commander of the Czech military resistance group The Nation´s Defense. ↩
- Richard Bienert (1881 – 1949) served as Prime Minister of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia from January 19, 1945 to May 5, 1945. ↩
- Albert Pražák (1880 – 1956) was Czech hisgtorian of literature. He headed the Czech National Council in May 1945. ↩
- Karl Hermann Frank (1898 – 1946) was a Minister of State as Reich Minister for Bohemia and Moravia and SS-Obergruppenführer and General of Police. He was executed after WW2. ↩
- Vladimír Krajina (1905 – 1993) was scientist, politician and a resiatnce leader during WW2. He went to exile after 1948. ↩
- Kamil Krofta (1876 – 1945) was a Czech historian, diplomat and a resistance leader who was arrested in 1944. ↩
- Ladislav Machoň (1888 – 1973) was Czech architect and a memebr of the Czech National Council. ↩
- The Czechoslovak Legion were volunteer armed forces composed predominantly of Czechs and Slovaks during World War I. Members of the Legions formed a significant part of the new Czechoslovak Army. ↩
- František Slunečko (1886 – 1963) was Czech general and a member of the Czech military resistance group The Nation´s Defense. ↩
- Karel Kutlvašr (1895 – 1961) was Czech general and one of the military commanders of the Prague Uprising. ↩
- Bedřich Reicin (1911 – 1952) was a Czechoslovak army officer who headed the counter-intelligence service of the Corps in 1945. ↩
- Josef Smrkovský (1911 – 1974) was a Czechoslovak politician and a member of the Communist Party reform wing during the 1968 Prague Spring. ↩
- Prokop Drtina (1900 – 1980) was Czech lawyer and politician and Minister of Justice until 1948. ↩
- Hubert Ripka (1895 –1958) was Czech journalist and Minister for Foreign Trade until 1948. ↩
- Jaroslav Stránský (1884 –1973) was Czech journalist and lawyer and Minister of Education until 1948. ↩
- Bedřich Homola (1887 – 1943) was Czechoslovak general and the commander of the Nation´s Defense resistance military organisation during Nazi occupation. ↩
- The Republican Party of Farmers and Peasants (Republikánská strana zemědělského a malorolnického lidu) a centre-right agrarian party of pre-war Czechoslovakia 1918 – 1938. ↩
- Svátek matek 1945 (Mother´s Day, Czechoslovakia, 1946, dir. K.M. Walló). ↩
- V horách duní (It rumbles in the the mountains, Czechoslovakia, 1946, dir. Václav Kubásek). ↩
- Velký případ (The Big Case, Czechoslovakia, 1946, dir. Václav Kubásek, Josef Mach). ↩
- Nikdo nic neví (Nobody Knows Anything, Czechoslovakia, 1947, dir. Josef Mach). ↩
- Němá barikáda (The Silent Barricade, Czechoslovakia, 1949, dir. Otakar Vávra). ↩
- Májové hvězdy (The Stars of May, USSR/Czechoslovakia, 1959, dir: Stanislav Rostockij, Stanislav Strnad). ↩
- Maratón (The Marathon, Czechoslovakia, 1968, dir. Ivo Novák). ↩
- Dny zrady I. a II. (The Days of Betrayal, Czechoslovakia, 1973, dir. Otakar Vávra). ↩
- Sokolovo (Czechoslovakia/USSR, 1974, dir. Otakar Vávra). ↩
- Osvobození Prahy (The Liberation of Prague, Československo, 1975, dir. Otakar Vávra). ↩
- Stůj, nebo se netrefím! (Stop, or I will Miss the Target!, Czech Republic/Slovak Republic, 1997, dir. Jiří Chlumský). ↩
- Musíme si pomáhat (Divided We Fall, Czech republic, 2000, dir. Jan Hřebejk). ↩